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Nature and 
selectiveness 
of social policy 
Ana S ojo ;^# 
It was in the 1980s that proposals for the targeting or 
focusing of social expenditure on the poor gained 
ground. These proposals contrast universality and 
selectivity in terms of a dilemma in a disjunctive 
relationship: targeting or universal policies, or 
targeting versus universal policies. 
In this article various economic and political 
arguments are advanced in defence of combining 
universality and antipoverty selectiveness in a 
strategy of mutual support in order to ensure that 
social investment in the welfare of the population 
can come to maturity. 
Section I deals with the evolution of the concept 
of targeting and criticizes some current proposals, 
taking into account both the equity and the 
effectiveness of social expenditure; section II 
presents some general guidelines for social policy in 
the 1990s; and section III points out some 
characteristics of dynamic selectiveness. 
•Social Affairs Consultant of the ECLAC Social 
Development Division. 
Marco Polo was describing a bridge, stone by 
stone. "But, which is the stone that supports 
the bridge?" asked Kublai Khan. "The bridge 
is not held up by one or another stone", 
replied Marco, "but rather by the arch line that 
they form". Kublai remained silent, 
thoughtful. Then he added "Why do you talk 
to me of the stones? It is only the arch that I'm 
interested in. "Polo answered, "Without the 
stones there is no arch". 
ítalo Calvino 
Obvious and less obvious 
aspects of targeting 
1. Evolution of the paradigm 
"Targeting"1 is the current proposal that has 
been most developed and has had most influence 
for modification of social expenditure. Although 
promoted by various agencies, the World Bank is 
the body that has worked it the most. In official 
documents and in proposals associated with the 
Bank, e.g., in unofficial studies disseminated or 
financed by the Bank, two stages can be seen, 
characterized by their significant shift of concep-
tual emphasis and by some important recent 
interpolations. 
a) Targeting and redistribution with growth 
In the 1970s the redistribution-with-growth 
debate impressed certain characteristics on the 
concept: it placed the crux of the analysis on the 
structural causes of poverty; it did not centre 
targeting on social policy; it did not propose a 
reductionism in social policy towards strictly 
selective programmes. Such intervention was 
only part of a spectrum of redistributive policies. 
The poverty attendant on the concentration 
of income was related to the lack of skills, capital 
assets and complementary assets of a sector of 
the population. It was proposed that, in addition 
'The term targeting or target-oriented does not aptly express 
the idea of selectiveness and is even tautological, since all policy has 
a target population, defined as "focus" or "target", including 
universal social policies, from which targeting policies are held to 
be separate. 
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to acting upon employment and income distribu-
tion by type of activity, the State should reallo-
cate public investment in such a way as to modify 
the underlying pattern of concentration of capi-
tal assets and human capital over time, in order 
thus to allow poor people access to such assets 
(Ahluwalia and Chenery, in Chenery et. al., 
1976). The success of the strategy, it was 
acknowledged, was limited by the resistance to 
asset-redistribution policies {ibid.). 
Redistributive objectives, it was stated, 
should be pursued through a wide variety of 
areas of intervention: factor market ownership 
and control of assets, personal income tax and 
wealth tax, the provision of consumer goods, 
goods markets, and intervention in technologi-
cal development. With regard to the latter it was 
stated: "It is unlikely that a single kind of eco-
nomic policy intervention can succeed in achiev-
ing distributive objectives. Not only is each 
instrument limited, but also the objectives are 
typically multidimensional, and certain kinds of 
intervention would only have an impact on one 
part of the distribution problem" (Ahluwalia, in 
Chenery et. al., p. 125) (unoffical translation). 
Targeting also included assets as deter-
minants of income. A target group was defined 
as " . . . a group of persons which, in addition 
to being poor, is relatively homogeneous in 
terms of the effect which a given set of policy 
instruments may have on it" (Dell and 
Duloy, in Chenery et. al., 1976 p. 127) 
(unofficial translation). It was stressed that the 
concept —by focusing on the causes rather than 
the symptoms of poverty— facilitated the 
identification of specific forms of assets 
that could improve the living conditions of 
various groups of poor people {ibid.). 
Targeting of social policy, with maternity-
infant and nutrition services, was described as 
" . . . a necessary supplement of a strategy aimed 
at investment..." (Ahluwalia and Chenery, in 
Chenery et. al., 1976, p. 77) (unofficial transla-
tion). In terms of public services, the criticism 
was made that the implicit subsidy would tend to 
benefit the upper and middle income sectors; it 
was proposed that the poor should be afforded 
better participation and not be discriminated 
against in policy formulation so that, by having 
access to such services, they too would raise their 
productivity (Rao, in Chenery et. al., 1976); and 
it was pointed out that it was necessary to elimi-
nate any trickle-down of benefits to non-target 
groups in some programmes (Chenery and 
Duloy, in Chenery et. al., 1976). However, fiscal 
difficulties were raised concerning the provision 
of more services to the poor without reducing 
them for other sectors and the resistance which 
these sectors would offer to the loss of their 
privileges (Rao, in Chenery et. al., 1976). 
b) Targeting and structural adjustment 
Over time this position was modified, possi-
bly by the impact of the political resistance 
already expected, by the debt crisis in the region 
and by the promotion of economic adjustment 
programmes to correct the external deficit. 
Interest then shifted to the symptoms of 
poverty. 
In the 1980s the issue of targeting, as part of 
the controversy over how to promote social 
progress, underwent a conceptual change. The 
importance attached to physical and human 
assets in the 1970s in a broad series of policies 
shifted towards social policy proposals focused 
on programmes to combat extreme poverty. The 
concept of targeting became essentially 
synonymous with that of selectiveness in social 
expenditure; the earlier concept of selectiveness 
was limited with respect to assets; physical 
assets were considered only marginally, and in 
the case of human assets, on numerous occasions 
minimum thresholds were proposed for the 
meeting of needs. 
On structural adjustment and poverty the 
World Bank stated: "Aside from ensuring that 
the adjustment programme is aimed at growth 
and elimination of the distortions that have an 
adverse effect on the poor, the other opportuni-
ties to modify adjustment programmes with a 
view to reducing losses in welfare of poor 
groups, without at the same time reducing gen-
eral economic efficiency, are probably limited" 
(World Bank, 1987a, p. 25). And again: "The 
most important way in which financing by the 
Bank for adjustment purposes can benefit the 
poor is through scrutiny and review of public 
spending, in particular spending of a social 
nature. The rationalization of public expendi-
ture and investment through an adjustment pro-
gramme may help to eliminate uneconomic 
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projects, reduce the number of ineffective and 
costly programmes, and direct social expendi-
ture to a greater extent towards the poor" {ibid., 
p. 28) (unofficial translations). 
Upon establishing that some social services 
are concentrated among high income sectors or 
that there is inefficiency in social expenditure, 
the World Bank generally proposes to focus on 
high-risk sectors: " . . .social programmes can 
be more cost effective and more equitable. If 
targeting is generally applied to public spending, 
it will be more effective, in which case there 
would be no trade-off between effectiveness and 
equity" (World Bank, 1988a, p. 13) (unofficial 
translation). Despite the differing characteris-
tics of government social expenditure in each 
Latin American country and the specific nature 
of their problems, this position is common in 
World Bank proposals for Latin America,2 and it 
can be summarized as follows: 
i) to help to resolve the fiscal crisis of the State 
through social policies; 
ii) to concentrate government social spending 
on the most vulnerable population through 
targeting policies; 
iii) to restrict State action in social policy 
matters; 
iv) negative evaluation of the concept of univer-
sality of services and criticism of universal 
policies because of the problems that they 
give rise to and because of their failures: it is 
proposed that the State should slowly drop 
universal policies through a relative and 
variable cutback in the instruments used for 
their implementation; 
v) a relative privatization of social policy is 
recommended, depending on whether 
2
 This does not mean a total absence of nuances in national 
and sectoral World Bank proposals. In an analysis of the nuances, 
even if they essentially relate to specific problems and contexts, it 
would be interesting to see to what extent they also reflect the 
impact of the ways in which each government negotiates with the 
Bank. There are, for example, certain claims made about Costa 
Rica, a country where universal social policies have prevailed and 
where such points proved controversial in adjustment 
negotiations. The Bank recognizes progress made in social matters 
and after analysing the problems of services and resources it 
proposes sectoral:targeting measures. But when it comes to 
education, where universal access to primary and secondary 
schooling and on-the-job manpower training is sought, it is 
striking that the comparative advantages of labour in Costa Rica 
are claimed to lie in the quality of human resources and not in low 
wages (World Bank, 1988b). 
national or sectoral policy is involved. On 
occasion it is even proposed that private 
services should be used for targeting. In this 
connection, little attention is given to the 
problems caused by the private delivery of 
services; 
vi) confidence that the primary distribution of 
income and raising of the standard of living, 
as a result of "spillover" and an upswing in 
economic activity, will guarantee non-target 
groups the capacity to pay for using private 
services (ECLAC, 1988; Demery and 
Addison, 1987, p. 34; World Bank, 1987a). 
Within this framework, the tension between 
universality and selectiveness in social policy 
becomes a dilemma: targeting versus universal 
policies. 
c) Some recent critical interpolations 
" . . . In effect, targeting has become a pana-
cea for alleviating poverty, since it is suggested 
that policy-making authorities can jump on the 
bandwagon; in other words, that with improved 
targeting a greater alleviation of poverty could 
be achieved with less expenditure. Unfortu-
nately, in the real world things are not so simple! 
There are good reasons why this paradisal world 
is not the one in which policy-makers in devel-
oping countries live, and tough decisions will 
have to be made that weight up the costs and 
benefits of targeting" (Besley and Kanbur, 1990, 
p. 21) (unofficial translation). 
In some recent studies financed or dissemi-
nated by the World Bank and by other agencies, 
certain difficulties are raised with regard to tar-
geting, in two main aspects: its viability and 
technical suitability, and the political considera-
tions. Both aspects have an impact on non-
selective policies. 
Increasing recognition has been given to the 
importance of political support in determining 
the effectiveness of structural changes. In the 
area we are interested in, this recognition has led 
to the distinction between tight targeting and 
broad targeting. Although it is argued that the 
first deals with considerations of effectiveness 
and social justice, the second is still desirable, for 
it brings in broader criteria of equity which enlist 
the political support of the influential middle 
groups in society and thus facilitate the imple-
mentation of sustained strategies of structural 
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change (Nelson, 1989a and 1989b). The princi-
ple of broad targeting addresses those areas in 
which the interests of the poor sectors overlap 
with those of the middle groups and states: "If 
targeting is designed both to reduce political 
risks and to soften the impact on welfare of the 
subsidy reduction, the target group cannot con-
sist only of the poor" (Nelson, 1989a, p. 107) 
(unofficial translation). Within this framework, 
when some programmes, such as food subsidies 
based on individual products or on place of resi-
dence cannot be targeted exclusively at the poor, 
this would prove to be more of an advantage 
than a drawback (ibid., p. 111). 
In addition, the little importance given to 
the package of antipoverty policies is considered 
to be a negative factor (ibid., p. 103) and it is 
recommended that compensatory programmes 
be designed, as far as possible, in order to 
support or serve as models for more far-reaching 
endeavours in favour of the poor, rather than as 
substitutes or variations thereof (ibid., p. 111). 
Such a proposal revives the emphasis of the 
1970s. 
Another recent study calls for the 
"economics of targeting". It states that, in 
contrast to the technocratic approach to poverty 
alleviation, which addresses primarily the 
information and administrative costs and 
undervalues there redistributional issues and the 
political conflict in play, it is important also to 
take into account the political support that 
various programmes can enjoy (Besley and 
Kanbur, 1990, p. 10). To this end, it is important 
to analyse the specific power structure of each 
country and its possible realignments: the 
balance of power determines programme 
continuity to a great extent; and the poor may be 
left out of political alliances when universal 
programmes are substituted for target-oriented 
ones. Adequate weighting of these factors could 
result in the exclusion of programmes that 
benefit only the population located below the 
poverty line, in order to draw closer to the more 
universally-oriented programmes that are the 
source of political cohesion (ibid., pp. 11 and 12). 
Both the instruments and the technical 
thinking on the issue have become increasingly 
sophisticated (Glewwe and van der Gaag, 1988; 
Glewwe and Kanaan, 1989). The benefit from 
targeting is defined as the additional amount 
that would be required by a non-targeted budget 
to cater to the poverty level reached through 
targeting (Ravillion and Chao, cited in Besley 
and Kanbur, 1990, p. 14). It has been argued that 
policies which eliminate the causes of poverty, 
and not just their effects, can prove to be less 
costly over the long run, insofar as they allow the 
productivity of poor households to be raised 
(Glewwe and van der Gaag, 1988, p. 33). 
Notable among the determinant technical 
factors for assessing the costs and benefits of 
targeting are the administrative and informa-
tion costs, for it is difficult to estimate and verify 
low incomes that are often irregular, and also the 
marginal tax rates. Although they imply trickle-
down effects, a positive evaluation is given to the 
use of indicators that are sufficiently correlated 
with income (e.g., regional indicators) in order 
to lower the administrative costs of other types 
of measurement (ibid., pp. 12-17). In addition, it 
is proposed that the individual reactions to tar-
geting should be taken into account: manipula-
tion of information, demand reduced by the 
programme's content rejection of stigma, self-
selectiveness (Besley and Kanbur, 1990). 
In light of these technical considerations and 
of the economics of targeting —factors that act 
against "fine targeting" of the poor and suggest 
the advantages of universal schemes— the opti-
mum strategy located between the two extremes 
is postulated, i.e., between perfect targeting and 
complete universality (ibid., pp. 3 and 20). 
2. Limitations of some targeting proposals 
A criticism presented below does not refer to 
selectiveness as such, in the abstract, but to cer-
tain concrete proposals and certain assertias 
about the relationship of selective programmes 
to other social programmes. 
a) The fluidity of poverty line boundaries 
Owing to the impossibility of accurately 
determining the boundaries of poverty lines and 
to the vulnerability of groups close to the pov-
erty threshold fixed in times of crisis, it is neces-
sary to estimate the alterations produced in the 
standard of living by a change in the target 
population of social programmes when non-
complementary targeting programmes are 
introduced. This must be done under very 
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diverse circumstances: both when the aim is to 
raise the redistributive effectiveness of social 
expenditure after it has been minimal, and when 
it is to eradicate poverty through a given transfer 
of total income, there having been a good redis-
tributive effect of social expenditure treating the 
poor as a priority but homogeneous group. 
When modifying the target population it is 
necessary to evaluate the redistributive capacity 
of existing programmes and to take the neces-
sary steps not to leave the high-risk sectors 
unprotected or unwittingly create new areas of 
poverty. It is also important to consider the fate 
of the intermediate population, for its impover-
ishment is not desirable either. 
b) The potential ineffectiveness of social ex-
penditure as a consequence of a static view of 
needs 
Some targeting schemes propose respond-
ing to the needs of age groups with a static 
approach, disregarding the future welfare of 
beneficiaries within the framework of social pol-
icy. Besides going against the goals of equity, this 
approach is a source of ineffectiveness, since it 
hampers the maturing of social investment. For 
example, if attention is focused on the various 
needs of high-risk persons only during the first 
years of life, it may happen that when they enter 
other stages of life —in the absence of suitable 
economic and social policies— these beneficia-
ries do not have their needs adequately met. This 
would be the case if their future depended on the 
income variable that is determined solely by 
market forces. 
c) One-sided arguments on social policy 
Targeting proposals tend to use the achieve-
ment of equity as an explicit benchmark for 
judging the effectiveness of government social 
spending. When equity is not achieved these 
schemes propose the privatization of services 
and the channelling of expenditure towards the 
poorest sectors of the population, and some-
times other social policy objectives are taken into 
account only marginally. 
For example, some World Bank studies on 
education priorities propose strengthening 
government spending on primary schooling and 
drastically cutting back expenditure on univer-
sity education, and even discontinuing it.3 As 
part of the strategy to obtain the funds that 
would be required in Latin America to guarantee 
six years of education for the entire population, 
the following has been proposed by way of 
example: "The most obvious way to finance 
these measures is gradually to phase out higher 
education subsidies and transfer these funds to 
primary rural education. In the majority of coun-
tries government spending on higher education 
accounts for half of the expenditure on primary 
education. A substantial amount of public funds 
would, therefore, be freed up if higher education 
became self-financing" (Selowsky, 1979, p. 78) 
(unofficial translation). 
With regard to equity, it is necessary to make 
some points about more equitable access to 
higher education if State support for it is main-
tained. The World Bank proposes promoting 
students loans and grants for those unable to 
pay. Redistributive assistance could also be facili-
tated by matching the cost of enrollment to the 
family income of the student. 
However, in order to evaluate the efficiency 
of social expenditure it is necessary to consider 
its various objectives and not just its distributive 
effect. In the case of universities it is of utmost 
importance to weigh the consequences of their 
relative privatization for scientific and 
technological development (for example, 
whether weaknesses would arise which in turn 
would cause blockages in economic 
development). 
d) Reductionism in distinguishing between 
public and private goods 
The World Bank tends to differentiate 
between public and private goods, stressing that 
the latter should not be an object of government 
'See Colclough, 1980, p. 19. A recent study on Brazil 
proposes, as a fundamental measure in education, to cutback State 
subsidies of higher education and to increase resources for 
secondary and university education (World Bank, 1988a, p. 64). In 
terms of rates of return it has been said ironically: "The reader who 
is unfamiliar with Bank statistics, particularly Economic Rates of 
Return as measures of project performance —is cautioned to take 
these numbers (as well as the somewhat strained distinction 
between poverty/non-poverty projects) with a grain of salt. 
Though they are cited as measurements by the Bank, they are 
indicators (sometimes convenient myths) that often serve to 
formalize what staff members subjectively know or believe in 
response to institutional requirements for "the numbers" (Annis, 
1986, p. 109). 
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expenditure and basing target-oriented policies 
on high-risk groups to which some public goods 
and even some private goods —such as food— 
should be provided in the case of extreme 
poverty. It is recognized that " . . . while goods 
are public or private, that is a matter of degree 
and can vary over time and space. As a result, 
there are no simple rules for achieving an 
optimum level and allocation of public spending. 
It can nevertheless be said that government 
expenditure is more effective the greater its 
emphasis on public goods" (World Bank, 1988a, 
p. 4) (unofficial translation). 
In social policy terms it is useful and neces-
sary to distinguish between public and private 
goods. However, when making this distinction 
in recent studies the World Bank has shown two 
systematic biases stemming from a proposed 
means of privatizing health services and cir-
cumscribing access by poor sectors to certain 
services: i) a dubious correlation, unrelated to 
the criterion of considering who is the target: in 
general, the goods that imply higher per capita 
costs are identified as private goods; and ii) the 
use of limited yardsticks to measure enjoyment 
of benefits: limiting the social impact to the 
utmost excludes the positive externalities of 
goods and services simply classified as private. 
These biases prevent enquiry into the posi-
tive externalities that are reciprocally created 
between social welfare and individual welfare. 
More than determining target groups, they lead 
to the exclusion of areas of social policy. In edu-
cation, for instance, primary schooling is identi-
fied as a public good and university education as a 
private good (ibid.), establishing a kind of educa-
tional polarization that can be made more rela-
tive by taking into account for example, 
positive-sum elements of social welfare. 
Moreover, the inadequate use of the concept 
leads to a limited definition of the so-called 
needs of the poor, e.g., the proposals on health 
when the treatment of high-cost diseases, such 
as heart or kidney disease is ranked as a private 
good, with the assertion that the cure would 
benefit only the patient.4 Or when it is simply 
4
 An analysis of social expenditure in Brazil made by the 
World Bank shows that a large part of expenditure on health in 
Brazil is allotted to private goods, such as services relating to heart 
surgery and dialysis that benefit only individuals, it is claimed, and 
asserted that the majority of curative services 
can be considered to be private goods (World 
Bank, 1987b, p. 700), and that the poor "tend to 
be more affected by health problems whose bet-
ter solution lies in preventive programmes" 
(ibid., p. 705) (unofficial translation). 
To solve the problem of health-service 
financing in developing countries on the basis of 
these premises the World Bank proposes to 
reduce " . . . government responsibility for pay-
ment for health services that provide scant 
benefits to society as a whole (as opposed to the 
direct benefits to users of the service). In this 
way a greater pool of government (or public) 
resources would be available to fund services that 
provide substantial benefits to the whole of 
society. This proposal, by relieving government 
of the burden of spending public funds to defray 
health care costs for the rich, would free up 
resources, and thus more could be spent on the 
poor" (World Bank, 1987b, p. 696) (unofficial 
translation). 
Thus, instead of defining health as a public 
good, this causes a kind of epidemiological polar-
ization of society in which rich and poor are 
assigned a strict place and those diseases that are 
more typical of developed countries are identi-
fied as pertaining exclusively to the rich and 
their treatment as a private good. Nevertheless, 
it is important to point out that the poor, 
whether urban or rural, require more services 
(both simply preventive and complex treat-
ment) owing to their precarious living condi-
tions (Frenk, 1987, p. 720) and to bear in mind 
the social externalities of individual health. 
e) Regressive modification of charges 
Neoliberal criticism regards the universal 
provision of services as unfair because all 
persons benefit equally, irrespective of their very 
different needs and resources.5 The World Bank 
curtail access to other public services (World Bank, 1988a, p. 4). 
See a similar distinction made in a World Bank proposal for all of 
Latin America in World Bank, 1987b, pp. 697 and 700. 
5
 This expresses a very old perspective on social policy that, 
paradoxically, has as the consequence of a residual policy with 
meritocratic goals. Each individual will be able to satisfy his needs 
in the market-place according to his merit. Hence, the redistribu-
tive welfare objectives of the State are termed "egalitarianism" and 
analysed negatively. As Hayek states (1985, p. 158) (unofficial 
translation), "while equality before the law —the treatment of all 
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argues that universality creates inequalities and 
in some instances it proposes the privatization 
of services or else differentiation of the charges 
for public services in order to benefit those 
groups deemed to have priority. The proposal is 
generally associated with limitation of State 
action aimed at priority groups, with a 
preference for a private system that provides 
services to the sectors able to pay and even to 
high-risk groups. This fails to address certain 
issues, such as: 
i) cost increases within the framework of pri-
vate provision of services, owing to their 
profit basis or inefficiency. As a negative 
example, it is worth bearing in mind the 
well-founded criticisms of the North Ameri-
can health system, whose private status is 
associated with high costs, problems of 
investment effectiveness and discriminatory 
access to services according to income;6 
ii) the probable regressive consequences of 
modification of service charges. This impact 
has been the object of concrete analyses, 
some of them financed by the World Bank. It 
was recently concluded on the situation in 
Peru: "It was observed that the introduction 
of user charges in Peru has the potential to 
raise cost-recovery income significantly, 
since the financial burden of the health sys-
tem (and the associated loss of social wel-
fare) is shifting from taxpayers to users. It 
was also found that the charges are regres-
sive in terms both of access to the health 
system and of social welfare". (Gertler et, al, 
1987, p. 653). 
f) Ownership of services and spurious 
correlations 
The assertion of spurious correlations 
between the optimum and the private provision 
of social services —the ad hoc rationale for an 
by government according to the same laws— would seem to me to 
be an essential condition of individual liberty, any difference in 
treatment that is required to put people who are individually very 
different on the same level would seem to me not only incompati-
ble with personal liberty but also highly immoral. But this is the 
sort of immorality towards which unlimited democracy is moving". 
6See Navarro Vicente, 1989. This noted expert, professor of 
health policy at Johns Hopkins University and President of the 
International Association of Health Policy, clearly states these and 
other interesting issues in a comparison of the United States with 
Canada. 
unlimited ideological choice for privatization— 
is also a serious matter. There is an example 
with regard to education: 
" . . . there is no obvious indication that State-
provided services are the best solution for poor 
families who cannot pay to educate their chil-
dren. The needs of these families can be met 
through student grants or loans systems. As was 
indicated in chapter 1, public authorities can 
provide money for a service without providing 
the service itself. And there are strong argu-
ments in favour of having private institutions 
serve these people: a private institution is more 
likely than a government to be more economical 
in the use of its teachers and other scarce resour-
ces and to have more incentives to avoid waste; 
and private schools are better equipped than 
State institutions to adapt their methods to new 
requirements" (Roth, 1987, p. 30) (unofficial 
translation; see also World Bank 1988a). 
Such an option is liable to be broadly rejected 
in the real world.7 
g) Potential administrative red tape and 
ineffectiveness 
Targeting implies establishing mechanisms 
to identify persons entitled to services. Some-
times sizeable sums can be spent from the funds 
available simply to set up a mechanism to deter-
mine the target group (Cohen and Franco, 1988, 
p. 37). In this case the achievement of the objec-
tives is hampered and the expenditure becomes 
ineffective. 
Let us look, for example, at the demands that 
the following proposal would imply in this 
respect: " . . .plans for mandatory insurance in 
low-income countries should not cover small and 
foreseeable costs, such as low-cost treatment, 
and should only absorb costs that may be con-
sidered catastrophic for a person. (Where it is 
possible to do so, the definition of catastrophic 
cost should be related to the family income 
level)" (World Bank, 1987b, p. 702). In this case 
other difficulties would be added to those already 
7
 See the negative views on the North American health 
system in The Economist No. 7630, 1989, pp. 21-24. Also, the 
problems of social works in Argentina described by the World 
Bank and by Katz and Muñoz, 1988. 
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outlined, with the proposal of a virtually ad hoc 
and individual determination of whether a situa-
tion is catastrophic or not. The timing of the 
decision as to whether a situation is catastrophic 
Economic and social policy are dimensions of 
development whose use to promote investment, 
employment and redistribution constitute the 
basis of democracy. Equity cannot be achieved by 
social services alone: to reduce it to this level 
implies misunderstanding its true nature and 
hinders the solution of its problems. Primary 
income distribution and employment are typical 
dimensions of economic policy that have major 
social effects. These and other dimensions show 
how economic policy determines social policy 
(ECLAC, 1986, p. 6 and ECLAC, 1987, p. 7). The 
establishment of co-ordinated goals between the 
two types of policy can create a virtuous circle, 
while lack of co-ordination between them makes 
for inefficiency in both. 
To have unrealistic expectations with 
respect to social policy objectives, whether these 
have to do with redistribution, equity or social 
cohesion, means to set impossible tasks (Cohen 
and Franco, 1988, pp. 25-29). For their part, 
specific social policy objectives may influence 
economic policy, and some dimensions of 
economic policy could well be regarded as part of 
social policy; this is the case with the extension 
of social benefits through tax exemptions and 
through certain kinds of loan. The structure of 
economic property is also a determinant; it 
marks out the boundaries of a social policy's 
rationale and its margins of influence. 
For effectiveness and equity it is essential to 
create functional relationships between produc-
tion, distribution and redistribution of income. 
In the case of the poor, this means taking them 
into account not only because they are high-risk 
or needy but also because they are economic 
agents. 
is crucial in this case, and yet the situation must 
be evaluated. In the case of health, even life may 
be jeopardized while the decision is being 
made. . . 
Equity and social security as guiding objectives of 
social policy imply integrated, active and preven-
tive social policy that does not simply react to 
emergency or temporary situations or serve as a 
mere palliative for the inequalities deliberately 
caused by economic policy in its social co-
ordinates. 
Universal policies and selective policies 
aimed at high-risk sectors should promote equal 
opportunities for access to and enjoyment of 
social services by modifying the effects of the 
market on income distribution and use. The 
complexity of social policy means that its res-
tructuring in the direction of equity and effec-
tiveness must be comprehensive and cannot be 
reduced to an end objective of a fiscal nature. 
Where the beneficiaries are concerned, the 
universal and selective approaches constitute the 
poles of social policy whose various specific com-
binations —depending on the circumstances— 
form the spectrum of social policy. Any 
restructuring of services must address both 
aspects through a suitable interaction of univer-
sal and selective policies.8 
With regard to equity, the regressive or pro-
gressive sign of universal or selective pro-
grammes cannot be analysed by considering each 
measure or policy on its own. The sign depends 
on the overall set of policies and their combina-
tion. Selectiveness is regressive —regardless of 
the concrete performance of some 
8
 The matching or interaction of universal and selective 
policies relates to the strategy, i.e., to the interrelationships of the 
two approaches within the broad spectrum of social policy. In 
concrete programmes, taken individually, either approach could 
obviously be complementary or exclusive. 
II 
General social policy guidelines for the 1990s 
1. Equity: the non-exclusive goal 2. Social policy objectives: 
of social policy a normative proposal 
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programmes— when it is part of a strategy of 
dismantling policies which have had a signifi-
cant progressive impact. It is problematical 
when it suffers from some of the problems indi-
cated in the preceding section on targeting or 
when there is a trickle-down effect. Universal 
policies are regressive when they do not ade-
quately take into account certain characteristics 
of the recipients, or as a result of the regressive 
nature of their funding or of other factors such as 
inefficiency, trickle-down, etc. 
These programmes are no less important for 
social integration and cohesion. By increasing 
the capacity to forecast results in the situations 
in which they operate they help to stabilize the 
rules of the game among the various players. 
There are different kinds of solidarity that con-
tribute to cohesion —national, professional, 
family, religious, associational, etc.— which can 
be expressed in social policy; for this reason a 
relative balance should also be sought between 
the various types of logic and instrument of 
protection, which are even at times necessarily 
contradictory. 
It is desirable to achieve positive-sum games 
through social policy, linking the needs of the 
various social sectors in the programmes. This is 
possible owing to what Jrgen Habermas calls 
"generalizable interests"; and in addition to 
achieving concrete objectives and increasing 
social cohesion it permits the social support base 
to be broadened to include the function of equity 
of social expenditure. 
The ravages of the crisis in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and its serious social conse-
quences make it necessary to set minimum 
national goals for meeting needs as one of the 
guiding criteria for the reform of social services; 
these goals should relate both to programme 
objectives and to the volume of investment. The 
constraints due to the crisis should not prevent 
the setting of such goals: we would point out that 
many social programmes in the region and 
throughout the world were developed even prior 
to the consolidation of post-World War II eco-
nomic growth cycles. 
3. The dynamic effects of investment 
in social policy 
The effectiveness of the State is related not only 
to the immediate effects of its action but also to 
the long-term dynamic effects that its action 
produces. Expenditure having long-term effects 
therefore warrants special treatment. Such 
expenditure includes —in addition to spending 
to increase capital assets— investments in 
human capital in such areas as education, nutri-
tion and health. Both are differentiated from 
expenditure whose main effect is to increase 
current consumption by programme beneficia-
ries (Foxley et. al., 1980, pp. 28 and 29). The 
effectiveness of investments by the State in 
human capital should also be evaluated in the 
light of their long-term effects. 
It is not advisable for State programmes to 
count only on increased current consumption in 
fighting extreme poverty. It is very important 
that the long-term dimension of nutrition, 
health, education and housing services, in con-
junction with adequate pay and employment 
policies, should contribute to meeting the basic 
needs of the beneficiaries and act against the 
transfer of poverty from one generation to 
another. 
On the other hand, State social policy should 
not be limited only to the fight against the mani-
festations of extreme poverty. This would res-
trict at several levels the dynamism produced by 
State investments in human capital. For exam-
ple, preventive actions could be neglected in such 
areas as health and nutrition; there is also the 
risk of eliminating the externalities of State 
social policy represented by investments in 
human capital which go beyond equity, under-
stood as guaranteed satisfaction of minimum 
needs, and can contribute to systemic cohesion, 
social mobility and technological development. 
4. Forward and reverse linkages 
in social policy 
The effects of forward and reverse linkages in 
social policy vis-a-vis the economy are usually 
recognized. It is then stated that some pro-
grammes, by affecting demand and broadening 
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the market, can create strong reverse linkages 
with production and income (World Bank, 1988, 
p. 67). Reverse linkage would result from the 
impact of demand growth on supply sectors or of 
the decline of other sectors; and forward linkage 
would result from the supply of social services 
insofar as they serve as an input in some activity. 
These considerations can make a twofold 
contribution: on the one hand, to identify the 
major beneficiaries of social projects, who do not 
always coincide with the target population; and 
on the other hand, to evaluate the attainment of 
project objectives and determine their coinci-
dence with national priorities (Cohen and 
Franco, 1988, pp. 222 and 223). 
At the risk of speculating, we want to use the 
metaphor of linkages in order, giving it another 
connotation, to identify the interrelationships of 
social policies and the relationships of social 
policy with the economy.9 We thus wish to high-
light the importance of promoting the ripening 
of investment in social policy through effective 
relationships between the various programmes 
that help to increase welfare. The relations are 
termed necessary owing to the complementary 
nature of the various aspects of welfare which 
implies the simultaneous consumption of the 
relevant goods and products. Maturity is 
expressed in the joint effect of the programmes 
which enhances the impact of what the individ-
ual and isolated effects of each programme 
would have been. This produces an accumulated 
effect in social policy quite apart from the pro-
gress attained in a limited area over a limited 
period of time. 
We define reverse linkages in social policy in 
its own field as the negative or positive effects 
9Our aspiration, perhaps unrealized, is to engage in a directed 
speculation. When using the concept of the effects of reverse and 
forward linkages in another field, we borrow only its higher-order 
predicates, i.e., those that "predicate something of properties or 
relationships. Examples of these higher-order predicates could be 
"symmetrical relation" and "biological property" (Bunge, 1986, 
p. 268). Looking into homologies of relationships we "export" 
these predicates of order and relationship to another field (¡bid., 
p. 226). In this way the concept, assigned a new meaning in 
another field, serves to create a new concept. We select the original 
concept because its connotations provide an adequate background 
for what we wish to express; thus, the new concept evokes 
relationship aspects of the original one which can promote 
dialogue on social policy. Of course, some formulations of the new 
concept paraphrase formulations pertaining to the original one 
made by Hirschman (1973 and 1984). 
that a measure or programme produces on 
demand in comparison with other social policies 
or programmes. Forward linkages —positive or 
negative— are the effects on other social pro-
grammes —either promotion or hindrance— of 
the supply of services deriving from a measure 
or programme. These linkages are internal. 
For their part, reverse linkages of social pol-
icy with economic policy describe the positive or 
negative demand effects that social policy 
requires from economic policy. Forward linkages 
describe the positive or negative conditions that 
the supply of social services creates for the adop-
tion of economic policy measures. These lin-
kages are external. 
The linkages are inherently determined by 
the characteristics of the goods produced and by 
the way in which they are produced. But here 
they are not understood strictly as productive 
inputs for a good. In this area, an attempt could 
be made to use terms such as fiscal links (as in 
Hirschman, 1984) or income links. 
Some linkages are determined by the various 
needs of individuals which viewed dynamically, 
give rise to social policies with permanent 
effects, e.g., health and education programmes 
suited to the various life stages. Others are condi-
tioned by the simultaneous care afforded various 
sectors of the population. An example of a 
reverse linkage of education is that a good educa-
tional yield requires a healthy and well-fed popu-
lation; an example of a forward linkage of 
education is that, with the achievement of cer-
tain habits and knowledge, it helps to improve 
nutrition and health; this implies intersectoral 
linkages of social policy (repercussions of decent 
housing on health and education) and intrasec-
toral ones. 
Social policy has a reverse linkage with eco-
nomic policy, via the funding required, and a 
forward one because it creates a better base dti 
which to increase income by raising labour pro-
ductivity. Potential or effective (active) linkages 
may be the subject of social and economic poli-
cies or not. A conscious attempt must be made to 
reduce the negative ones and promote the posi-
tive. In our opinion, disregard of them could lead 
to failures and to greater outlays due to-possible 
unforeseen negative effects caused by the recip-
rocal blocking of different measures. But, if posi-
tive linkages are reinforced, suitable 
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interrelationships between social policies will be 
consciously promoted. In the relationship 
between economic policy and social policy this is 
equivalent to creating a virtuous circle. 
Within the domain of social policy itself, it is 
fundamental consciously to reinforce potential 
positive forward and reverse linkages to pro-
mote different programmes on a reciprocal 
basis. Such reinforcement can help to ensure: 
a) the efficient and effective use of social expen-
diture; b) social policy continuity which allows 
for sustained maturing of expenditure over time; 
and c) fuller achievement of equity goals. This 
means determining the amount and kinds of 
linkages within social policy, i.e., their interde-
pendence, and their linkages with economic pol-
icy. The characteristics of the problems to be 
solved and the classification of needs or short-
falls can be the focus for analysis of the impor-
tance and viability of linkages. The direct and 
indirect impacts of social policy can then be 
ascertained, as can the relationships to be pro-
moted in the light of their potential importance 
and viability. This will help to establish priori-
ties in programmes with strong linkage effects 
and reject those with undefinable or unlikely 
linkages or those that are unsuitable in terms of 
the established objectives. 
What is involved is a dynamic perspective, 
for the promotion of suitable linkages requires a 
period of development and is subject to change 
owing to cumulative effects. 
5. The volume and rationalization of 
social expenditure 
Social services can be defined as the institution-
alization over time of a given resource distribu-
tion pattern (Mishra, 1984, p. 33). 
Selectiveness relates strictly to the identifi-
cation of specific target groups; it is not syn-
onymous with the limitation of social 
expenditure. So much so that in critical situa-
tions attending to the high-risk population can 
imply increased social spending. Given the polit-
ical will, the increase in social expenditure would 
be unavoidable in those countries that have allo-
cated a minimal budget for this purpose. When 
cuts in public social spending have been asso-
ciated with a deterioration of the living condi-
tions of the population, it is imperative to make 
an effort to restore adequate levels of spending. 
Also, in some cases resources could be reoriented 
towards social policy, e.g., in countries where 
military spending is very high. This obviously 
implies complex political processes relating to 
peace-keeping and the establishment of demo-
cratic and stable rules for coexistence. 
In all cases unmet national demands that 
cannot be covered by setting up mechanisms for 
rationalization of expenditure force an exten-
sion of public social spending, To do this it may 
possibly be necessary to enlarge the State's 
resources, and this brings us —among other 
things— to debt relief, to fiscal reforms to 
increase the progressivity of taxation, and the 
redistributive assistance in the funding of social 
services. 
When resources earmarked for selective 
purposes are not new but reallocated from other 
programmes, it is necessary to safeguard against 
detriment to other useful social policy objectives, 
for example when preventive action in health 
and nutrition is transformed into curative action. 
Better co-ordination with private social 
policy initiatives (of non-governmental 
organizations and others) is also required. These 
initiatives should not be confused with the 
private delivery of services through the market, 
since they are non-profit. To improve the 
effectiveness of programme coverage it is 
necessary to introduce reforms at various levels. 
The possibilities of broadening the spectrum of 
target groups through resource reallocation and 
organizational changes should be explored. The 
more efficient use of resources through the 
introduction of expenditure rationalization 
mechanisms offers various means of broadening 
social services or improving their quality. 
If it is a matter of dismantling public services 
(e.g., self-financing of higher education) and not 
of reforming them, it is important to consider 
whether tax avoidance by high-income sectors 
would increase in response to a goal of 
channelling social spending very strictly towards 
target-oriented policies. This is crucial when the 
tax rate is low and social expenditure scant. 
Within the framework of the universal 
provision of services or services directed to 
broader sectors, selectiveness criteria could be 
applied to alleviate poverty when payment for 
services is not uniform: the redistributive aspect 
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can consist precisely of combining the same kind 
and quality of services with payment 
differentiated according to income. From the 
point of view of redistributive assistance, 
unequal contributions based on income levels 
should ensure basic services for all (ECLAC, 
1988). 
6. Social policy, technological 
innovation and productivity 
In periods of transition towards a new phase of 
economic development geared to technological 
innovation and increased productivity, the role 
of social policy is vital with respect to 
employment. In the face of changes in 
technology, resource allocation, industrial 
retooling and restructuring of the State, all 
promoted in order to raise productivity, the 
vulnerability of labour can be affected by 
economic and political constraints that lower job 
mobility. And this for obvious reasons: in the 
absence of other measures, overcoming the 
constraints simply causes unemployment. 
It is possible to increase labour mobility and 
to pursue equity if the State promotes 
manpower-training policies and subsidizes 
unemployment, within the framework of 
industrial refitting, the promotion of new 
exports and reform of the State. In countries 
with an extensive informal or underground 
economy these policies are essential means of 
raising industrial productivity. 
In the area of education and human 
resources it is possible to combine innovations 
which work against technological development 
in relatively less developed countries, help to 
develop the productive sector, and promote 
democratization by putting technologies within 
the reach of low-income children.10 
Improvements in productivity should 
contribute, for their part, to a lowering of service 
delivery costs, which would have a positive 
impact on social spending. 
7. On public and private goods 
According to the classical definition of a pure 
public good formulated by Samuelson, individual 
consumption of this type of good does not reduce 
10
 See Fonseca, 1989, on the computer education programme 
in Costa Rica. 
or impede another individual's consump-
tion —in contrast to what occurs with private 
goods that are divided and distributed to differ-
ent individuals. The debate on the virtual inex-
istence of any public goods thus defined led to 
the assertion that public goods are an extreme 
and that goods possess various degrees of public-
ness and various levels of non-exclusiveness in 
price and non-competition in consumption. 
It is useful to distinguish between public and 
private goods in order to identify suitable areas 
for public expenditure: the greater the actual 
publicness of the goods, the greater the effective-
ness of public spending. Since there is no objec-
tive distinction between the two, to establish a 
distinction inevitably involves ethical and value 
judgements. It is essential to consider the 
interrelation of individual welfare and social 
welfare, i.e., to examine the reciprocally positive 
externalities that generate social and individual 
welfare. Otherwise, a criterion for public action 
becomes a source of exclusion of areas of social 
policy. 
It is also useful to remember a characteristic 
of public goods highlighted by Hirschman: "it is 
not only that all can consume them, but that one 
cannot avoid using them unless one exits the 
community that provides them. Consequently, 
whoever says public goods says public ills" 
(Hirschman, 1977, p. 100). For this reason, and 
because of the public dimensions of private 
goods, "it is impossible to avoid them com-
pletely. Despite one's exit, one continues to be a 
product user or at least of its external effects 
from which we cannot escape" {ibid., p. 103). 
These ideas constitute a good argument 
against zero-sum views in social policy. It is 
unrealistic to think that poor conditions of 
health, education and employment exclusively 
affect those who suffer them in the flesh. As 
Hirschman points out, "Obviously, a private citi-
zen can "exit" public education by sending his 
children to a private school, but at the same time 
he cannot exit it, in the sense that his life and 
that of his children will be affected by the quality 
of public education. There are many goods of this 
nature that are ostensibly private that we can 
purchase or not purchase; but they entail a public 
good dimension (what economists often refer to 
as 'external economies'), such that their mere 
production and use by others, affects, dignifies or 
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degrades the life of all community members" 
(ibid., p. 101) (author's emphasis) (unofficial 
translation). 
Over and above the unmet needs of a broad 
sector of the population, the increase in crime, 
political polarization, civil war, and social 
disintegration in which some countries virtually 
find themselves, or the impossibility of recovery 
of output owing to the lack of skilled labour, are 
Selective programmes will be more effective and 
avoid dependence on the State by the needy to 
the extent that they are co-ordinated with mea-
sures to combat the structural causes of poverty. 
The design of such programmes implies: a) eva-
luating the redistributive characteristics of pub-
lic social spending; b) identifying areas of 
selective spending; c) using suitable instru-
ments; d) taking account of their interrelation 
with universal programmes or those intended 
for other sectors of the population. 
1. On the quality of selective services 
By definition, selectiveness in social policy pre-
supposes the exclusion of certain income groups 
from certain programmes. It is essential to safe-
guard against the exclusion leading to poor qual-
ity of services owing to the weak political clout of 
poor sectors. In Hirschman's words (1977), we 
can postulate that "a proper exit" or an exclusion 
of non-incorporated social sectors is essential: 
the "absentees" should continue to ensure the 
quality of the selective public good; when ceasing 
to consume a public good directly, people should 
not behave as if it were a private good, for in that 
case an "exit" or ending of consumption, in turn, 
ends the relation between the client or member 
and the product or agency that is being dropped. 
In social policy the direct users determine 
only partially the quality of the service. The 
social sectors with greater political and economic 
power are the ones which can have a greater 
influence on the quality of public services. If 
irrefutable proof of the national repercussions of 
restricted use or denial of goods with public 
dimensions on large sectors of the community. 
On the other hand, enjoyment of public goods, 
such as social integration in democracy, good 
health and education indicators, and high capital 
and labour productivity in a society, among other 
elements, represent forms of synthesis of proper 
community enjoyment of various kinds of goods. 
selectiveness is not to be synonymous with low-
quality stratified services for the poor, the 
excluded sectors should continue to care about 
the quality of services, even if they are not direct 
users. The rationale for such conduct can be 
based on what Hirschman says: "total exit is 
impossible" since, in a sense, the excluded con-
tinue to use the product (ibid., p. 99). 
2. The importance of identifying poverty 
Perfect selectiveness requires total transparency 
of expenditure levels by individuals. In the real 
world selectiveness is imperfect: it is carried out 
on the basis of faulty information on eligible 
beneficiaries.11 Depending on the identification 
of poverty, two basic kinds of selectiveness can 
be distinguished.12 
Selectiveness is direct when the choice of 
beneficiaries is made individually, on a case-by-
case basis, determining whether the persons or 
family groups meet the requirements of the pro-
gramme objectives. This means obtaining spe-
cific and detailed information on groups or 
households that is generally obtained from the 
households themselves. A very detailed profile 
of poor households is required in order to deter-
11
 We have taken the distinction originally proposed for 
targeting from Glewwe and Kanaan, 1989, p. 22, an unofficial 
study financed by the World Bank. 
12
 With very slight changes, for the purposes of this 
distinction we again use the one originally proposed for a targeting 
strategy in Glewwe and van der Gaag, 1988, pp. 28 and 29. 
Ill 
Some guidelines for dynamic selectiveness 
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mine their eligibility; owing to the imperfec-
tions of the information, the greater the degree 
of selectiveness intended, the more difficult 
selectiveness becomes. This mechanism also 
demands that information be updated every so 
often; moreover, the evaluation of programme 
results should essentially be done on an individ-
ual basis. It may be inappropriate to make the 
selection only on the basis of data obtained 
directly from the potential beneficiaries because 
of the possible biases, especially if these biases 
can influence the potential use of data (ibid., 
Glewwe and van der Gaag, 1989, pp. 31-33). 
Selectiveness can also be based on general 
information on possible beneficiary groups or 
households (e.g., through a household survey), 
from which one identifies the beneficiary group, 
region or community and their needs. In this 
case the ways in which the programme operates 
a,re also changed. Selection criteria can include 
variables of territory or region or mode of 
occupation (informal or precarious jobs in 
workshops, co-operatives, etc.); different 
combinations of criteria could also be made.13 
Clearly, to opt for direct selectiveness or 
selectiveness according to certain general crite-
ria, we must have various kinds of information 
available. When choosing a type of selectiveness, 
it is wise to ascertain what kind of information is 
available whether it is possible to obtain addi-
tional information, and what the costs are. It is 
advisable to draw on the store of information on 
coverage and quality of services and their effects 
which has traditionally been handled by public 
agencies responsible for sectoral social policies 
(Vergara, 1990), and to organize a comprehen-
sive social information system. 
In terms of the effectiveness of social spend-
ing determined by cost-benefit analysis, it is 
imperative to ascertain what information is 
worth gathering. This decision is affected by the 
poverty line selected, the definition of poverty 
used, the amount allocated to poverty allevia-
tion, and the initial information available. If 
poverty can be reduced to a great extent with a 
fixed amount of resources by using additional 
information, and if the savings due to selective-
ness exceed the cost of obtaining the additional 
"Criteria offered by Vergara, 1990, as alternative approaches 
to targeting in Chile which we believe to be of general interest. 
information, then it should be corrected 
(Glewwe and van der Gaag, 1989, p. 22). 
The identification of the key characteristics 
of the poor and of feasible policies for fighting 
poverty requires competent and timely research; 
in some cases this can constitute a constraint 
(Glewwe and van der Gaag, 1989, p. 34). If, 
paradoxically, there is a correlation between the 
greater extent and intensity of poverty and the 
various constraints on such research on selec-
tiveness (infrastructure, skilled personnel, ade-
quate budget), it is better to opt for indirect 
selective mechanisms. 
The poverty indexes used should be suited to 
the kind of vulnerability or basic needs that are 
to be addressed. It is not advisable to develop a 
global poverty index to serve as a basis for grant-
ing very diverse subsidies: its use prevents spe-
cific solutions and excludes persons who display 
acute needs in some respects owing to the over-
estimate of values in other variables.14 
The kind of need detected will have to be 
expressed in the programme profile. The way in 
which the poverty is to be alleviated will then 
determine the use of the appropriate mecha-
nisms, the introduction of measures that are 
outside the field of social policy, the relationship 
between individual transfers to beneficiaries or 
the promotion of regional and community pro-
grammes, etc.15 
3. On sectors excluded from selectiveness 
To draw a poverty line presupposes a value 
judgement, as does the setting of goals. In this 
case it must be determined whether, with the 
policies adopted, the aim is to eradicate poverty 
or whether a level of poverty shall exist and only 
poverty in excess of that level shall be fought. 
When non-selective programmes are elimi-
nated or cut back, it will have to be decided 
whether they have benefitted those sectors adja-
cent to the poverty line which are to be the focus 
of the whole effort. In order to prevent new 
areas of poverty it is necessary to consider 
changes that may occur in the standard of living 
as a result of changes in the target populations. 
HSee footnote 13. 
"See footnote 13. 
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There are several reasons for this: a) the fluidity 
of poverty-line boundaries; b) the relative 
inability of these lines to indicate the depth of 
poverty; c) the vulnerability in crises of groups 
located slightly above the cut-off poverty lines. 
It is also imperative to evaluate the repercus-
sions that all this has on the intermediate popu-
lation (e.g., for the third income quintile). If one 
of the social policy objectives is to promote social 
mobility and equity, it is not advisable to cause 
—through selectiveness combined with the 
abandonment of these sectors— their impover-
ishment by the cost of paying for access to pri-
vate services. The deterioration of their living 
conditions through lack of access to services such 
as health and education, among others, would 
stem from the income elasticity of private 
spending in such areas. 
In order to exclude sectors is not enough to 
prove that sectors with relatively good incomes 
have benefitted; it is also necessary to consider 
the tax contribution made by the different 
sectors. It is advisable to exclude those which 
while able to do so, do not make any 
contributions, or else to raise their contributions. 
Exclusion is not right when the tax contribution 
of those that are eventually excluded is essential. 
In Chile, for example, middle-income groups 
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1960s and obtained State benefits in almost 
equal proportion to their contribution to 
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through taxes (Foxley et. al., 1980, pp. 183-188). 
4. Changes in the sectors chosen and in 
the population in general: challenges 
for selectiveness 
Various reasons compel us to consider the 
dynamism of the population at the time the 
target groups are established: 
i) the effects on the population of the social 
policies themselves, or of economic policy 
on employment and wages; 
ii) the simultaneous care of needs relating to 
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population, in order to reinforce welfare and 
ensure that investment in social policy 
comes to fruition; 
iii) the goal of helping to create positive reverse 
and forward linkages of selective policies; 
and 
iv) the objective of making the reciprocal 
promotion of the various social policy 
programmes feasible by acting on the 
interrelated manifestations of poverty. 
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